

Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 EDINBU 00306 161658Z

43

ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 FBO-02 A-01 SCCT-01 USIA-06

ABF-01 /029 W

----- 056309

R 161600Z DEC 75

FM AMCONSUL EDINBURGH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 947

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE EDINBURGH 0306

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: SECURITY PROTECTION AFFORDED PUBLIC ACCESS
AREAS AT OVERSEAS POSTS.

REF: (A) STATE 210312; (B) STATE 271528;
(C) LONDON A-719 SEPTEMBER 9, 1974

LONDON FOR RSO

IN REPLY REF A POST HAS GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO
THE MOST PRACTICABLE WAY TO AFFORD PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
ACCESS AREAS MF THE CONSULATE GENERAL WHILE NOT DETRACT-
ING EXCESSIVELY FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE BUILDING. WE
PERCEIVE THE MAJOR THREAT FROM TERRORIST ATTACK WOULD
PROBABLY COME FROM ONE OF TWO DIRECTIONS:

1. A BOMB THROWN FROM A PASSING CAR THROUGH ONE OF THE
LARGE PLATE GLASS WINDOWS IN THE FRONT OF THE BUILD-
ING.
2. AN INVASION OF THE BUILDING BY ARMED TERRORISTS
DURING WOPKING HOURS.

A DETAILED JUQTIFICATION OF OUR REASONING AND PLANS WILL
FOLLOW BY OM COORDINATED THROUGH RSO LONDON. HOWEVER,
IN ORDER TO MEET GENERAL PLANNING DEADLINES IN WASHINGTON
THE FOLLOWING BASIC INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED USING THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 EDINBU 00306 161658Z

FORMAT IN REF A.

A. PROPERTY: THREE STORY STONE TOWNHOUSE AT 3 REGENT TERRACE, GOVERNMENT OWNED.

B. PHYSICAL SECURITY BARRIERS: 1. CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO AN ARMORED PHYSICAL BARRIER TO SEAL OFF ON INSIDE A DOORWAY EIGHT FEET HIGH, FIVE FEET WIDE AND APPROXIMATELY EIGHTEEN INCHES DEEP. THE LOWER PORTION (NO MORE THAN THREE FEET HIGH) MAY BE OF A WOOD VENEER EXTERIOR BUT ARMORED TO PROTECT THE RECEPTIONIST WHO WOULD BE LOCATED RIGHT BEHIND IT. THIS SAME WOOD VENEER, ARMORED MATERIAL COULD COME FROM THE CEILING LEAVING A SPACE FOR ABOUT THREE FEET OR LESS OF HEAVY BULLET-RESISTANT GLASS. A DOOR WOULD BE PLACED IN THE BARRIER AT ONE SIDE THAT COULD BE OPERATED ELECTRICALLY BY THE RECEPTIONIST. AS SOON AS SHE DETERMINED THAT THE VISITOR HAD BUSINESS IN THE PASSPORT SECTION OR IN ANOTHER AREA OF THE CONSULATE SHE COULD UNLOCK THE DOOR BY A SWITCH ON HER DESK. VISA APPLICANTS WOULD BE DIRECTED INTO THE VISA SECTION THROUGH THE OTHER DOOR ON PUBLIC SIDE OF BARRIER. (SEE FLOOR PLAN OF POST CONTAINED IN REF. C). 2. THE DOOR INTO THE VISA SECTION AND THE DOOR THROUGH THE BARRIER MIGHT HAVE ELECTRICAL DEAD-BOLT LOCKS WHICH WOULD ENGAGE AUTOMATICALLY WHEN THE RECEPTIONIST SOUNDED THE ALARM. THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY SEAL OFF THE WORKING AND WAITING ROOM AREAS FROM THE INTRUDERS, WHOSE ONLY ENTRANCE IS THE FRONT DOOR. THE REAR DOORS ARE KEPT LOCKED AND MAY ONLY BE APPROACHED THROUGH THE WALLED BACK GARDEN FROM A PRIVATE PARK, WHOSE ENTRANCE IN TURN MUST BE GAINED THROUGH ONE OF THE TOWN-HOUSE RESIDENCES SURROUNDING

THE PARK. THE DOOR TO THE VISA SECTION AND THROUGH THE BARRIER COULD BE ALWAYS UNDER POSITIVE CONTROL OF THE RECEPTIONIST. AFTER SHE IDENTIFIED THE VISITOR AND DETERMINED WHICH AREA HE WISHED TO VISIT SHE WOULD ELECTRICALLY RELEASE THE LOCK ON THE APPROPRIATE DOOR ALLOWING HIM TO ENTER. 3. COSTS UNKNOWN: WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE AIRGRAM PROMISED IN STATE 238488 AND HAVE NO WAY OF ESTIMATING COSTS OF THIS MATERIAL. 4. THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 EDINBU 00306 161658Z

DISADVANTAGE FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS STANDPOINT OF THIS FORTRESS IN THE EDINBURGH CONSULATE IS SELF-EVIDENT.

C. WINDOW PROTECTION: WE WILL NEED SHATTER-PROOF OR BULLET-RESISTANT GLASS FOR THE LARGE FRONT WINDOWS TO PROTECT AGAINST THROWN BOMBS OR GUNFIRE. EIGHT PANES OF GLASS APPROXIMATELY FORTY SEVEN BY FORTY THREE INCHES WIDE WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR GROUND FLOOR. NEW WINDOW

CASINGS WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION AS THE
CURRENT ONES ARE OLD AND ROTTING.

D. LOCAL GUARD FORCES: NOT NEEDED.

E. MARINE SECURITY GUARDS: NOT NEEDED.

F. TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT: AN ALARM OPERATED FROM THE
RECEPTIONIST'S DESK, SHOULD BE PROVIDED. IT COULD
PERHAPS BE HOOKED INTO THE FIRE ALARM SYSTEM.

G. LOBBY CONTROLS AND EQUIPMENT: AS STATED IN B ABOVE.

H. CONNECTIONS WITH LOCAL POLICE FORCE ARE ADEQUATE.

I. RADIOS: VEHICLE AND BASE STATION RADIO ALREADY
INSTALLED.

FUNKHOUSER.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 DEC 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: johnsorg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975EDINBU00306
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750437-0243
From: EDINBURGH
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751236/aaaabfzh.tel
Line Count: 133
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SY
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 210312, 75 STATE 271528
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: johnsorg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 JUN 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <06 NOV 2003 by johnsorg>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECURITY PROTECTION AFFORDED PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS AT OVERSEAS POSTS.
TAGS: ASEC
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006